Life, Dreams and Reality -- Sohel's Blog

Comments on international news, scientific, political and philosophical musings, poems, fictions, music and book reviews.

Wednesday, August 31, 2005

Katrina's "God"

Katrina's "God"

The devastation is staggering. Major American cities are in ruin, under water, unknown number of dead, and unreachable many in remote places, provide a stark picture of the power of nature in its full vigor over humanity's toy like "civilization". With American world reputable might in constant display throughout its military operations or economic muscles, seeing the hapless poor, mostly African Americans or Latino or other immigrant communities, wading through chest deep water in the midst of total chaos, rampant looting from abandoned stores, submerged or smashed new model cars gutted on the flooded street, one cannot avoid pondering if this remains the pitiful reality of a lone superpower, then, all the other nations of our world -- poor, poverty stricken -- what could have been their "reality" in the face of nature's "without prejudice" steam rolling?

"Have God on your side", uttered a New Orleans resident just before Katrina ripped through Gulf coast, sitting beside her puppy dog while fleeing the city in her old modeled rusty car. The Church priests or Mosque Imams could blather "God's" unbounded mercy in sparing millions of innocent people from the wrath of Katrina, they may say that "God was on their side". Huh! Why "God" has to take side on the matter of saving innocent lives? Doesn't "God" have unbounded mercy to bestow to "His" poor children on earth? If "God" does take side, why exalting "Her" as the most "compassionate" when compassion was not present in drowning deaths of unknown many of New Orleans residents, or perhaps if our memory hasn't forsaken us, what had the crimes of those poor children and adults in last year's catastrophic tsunami in South Asia? "God" has so much mercy, it is not only through water or storm, through fire "It" shows its unbounded "mercy", 17 African immigrants burned to death, 6 of them innocent children, in France's poor community.

"You blasphemous soul! God has nothing to do with these!"-- you or other good natured, "God" fearing folks may utter these sharp replies with complete disgust. You may roll your furious eyes, even pointing fingers at me while shaking head from left to right to left, absolving "God" from all responsibilities. It is all our faults! "Men are fallen from grace!" You may shove oldie goldie scriptures, "God's" direct commandments, to nullify unpalatable thoughts. "Don't question God's wisdom", maybe the "wise" amongst ourselves squeaks in their rebuttals, but in the end, the truth remains the same. Katrina's "God" seemed to be overpowering in its ferocity comparing to the benevolent "God's" omnipotent benevolence.

"God" or "no God", the evidences aplenty, human beings and other animate and inanimate beings are their own in facing bleak extinction. "God" supposedly does not face extinction. Does "He" know the feelings of vulnerability? Katrina's "God" shatters and mangles, but what may a "loving" "God"'s response be?

Is there complete uncaring silence in immeasurable cosmos?

I don't suppose "God" surfs Internet, well perhaps the elite sites, not the discussion forums anyway. But again the question remains, why differentiating between elite and non-elite sites? Isn't "God" supposed to be full of goodies, enshrined with blinding equality? If not, is "God" prejudiced? Are these too "immature" to ask? What is maturity then? Being subservient to established ideologies? No untraditional questions asked?

Like Pink Floyd asked in its music of "Wall" years ago, one may ask, "Is there anybody out there?" Let's hope for humanity's sake, that there is no Katrina's "God" out there to the least.

Regards,
Sohel
Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/31/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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Monday, August 29, 2005

A Tale of Two Wars

Iraq and Vietnam. Two wars. Two different era. For many, these two wars cannot be compared to each other. Goal was different. Weaponry was not the same. And now the politicians and warriors are more sleek in their truth hiding endevours.

But can history be completely ignored? In the face of daily deaths and destructions in Iraq, the bygone era's forgotten history presents us more striking analogies between these two wars.

"that Iraq was not a terrorist haven before we invaded, but we're making it into one today -- has been thickly painted over with unending coats of misinformation." -- indeed, misinformation and propaganda are the two most useful tools of any vicious war.

Regards,
Sohel


A Tale of Two Wars

In Baghdad, I Hear Echoes of Saigon in '67

By Lewis M. Simons
Sunday, August 28, 2005; B01

went to Vietnam a hawk. It was July 1967; I was an ex-Marine and a reporter for the Associated Press. It took only a few months before I realized I was being fed official lies on a daily basis. Now, having spent decades covering war and its aftermath around the world, I have just been through an eerily reminiscent experience in Iraq.

In the Baghdad of 2005, as in the Saigon of four decades ago, my government tells me that by staying the course, we'll cut out a vicious tumor metastasizing through the body of Western democracy.

Today's cancer is terrorism, not the red menace. But the singular constant remains this: Armies and governments at war all lie. They tell us that we're winning hearts and minds, that the troops will be home for Christmas, that the mission is accomplished. They did it then, and they're doing it now.

My hawkishness is long gone. I went to Iraq this May on an assignment for National Geographic magazine, already convinced that this war was a mistake. I found myself cloistered in a nightmare world, behind layers of 12-foot concrete barriers beyond which no thinking American strays without armed guards. I returned home a month later, certain that this war, like Vietnam, will never be won.

What would "winning" in Iraq mean, anyway? A democratic society that's free to elect an anti-American, pro-Iranian, fundamentalist Islamic government? A land of gushing oil wells feeding international oil company profits at U.S. taxpayers' expense? Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis joining hands to end terrorism around the world? Since, in my judgment, we were wrong to go in, I'm afraid there's no good way to get out.

Americans didn't know what "winning" meant in Vietnam, either. Most didn't understand the enemy, its objectives or the lengths to which it was prepared to go to attain them. We had a fuzzy notion of communist "world domination," and the "domino theory" and no realization that what the Vietnamese wanted, south and north, was independence. They didn't want to take over Southeast Asia. They didn't want to invade Los Angeles. They wanted to run their own country. They wanted us out.

Nor do we understand Iraq. The truth -- that Iraq was not a terrorist haven before we invaded, but we're making it into one today -- has been thickly painted over with unending coats of misinformation.

The enemy body-count fiasco at Saigon's daily "5 o'clock follies" -- as military briefings were dubbed by a derisive press corps -- has been replaced by meaningless claims of dead insurgents. Lyndon Johnson's vision of "light at the end of the tunnel" has evolved into Dick Cheney's embarrassing "last throes." Where 392 Americans were killed in action in Vietnam from 1962 through 1964, the first three years of the war, (and 58,000 by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 1975), after 2 1/2 years in Iraq we have nearly 1,900 American KIAs. Where 2 million Vietnamese were killed by the war's end, we have no idea how many Iraqis have died since we unleashed "shock and awe." Is it 10,000, 20,000, 30,000? More? Who knows? Who in America cares?

This blithe American disregard for their lives infuriates Iraqis. After President Bush recently congratulated soldiers at Fort Bragg for fighting the terrorists in Iraq so that we wouldn't have to face them here at home, a Baghdad University professor told an interviewer that Bush was saying that Iraqis had to die to make Americans safe.

What we failed to understand in Vietnam -- that people who want foreign occupiers out of their country are willing and prepared to withstand any kind of privation and risk for however long it takes -- we are failing, once again, to grasp in Iraq.

I've returned repeatedly to Vietnam since the war. About 20 miles northwest of Saigon, in Cu Chi, I had one of the more harrowing experiences of my reporting career, crawling for an hour through black, airless, grave-like tunnels that spider-web for well over 100 miles beneath the jungle floor. (This was before the Tourism Ministry enlarged some of the passages, to accommodate super-size Western travelers.)

Here, entire armies and civilian communities had lived and worked and plotted attacks, through not just the American war but the earlier war against the French. With dirt dropping into my sweat-stinging eyes, my imagination raced: What must it have been like with tanks and bombers rumbling overhead? When I stumbled out, heart pounding, I told my guide that finally I understood why his side had won.

Today, Muslim suicide bombers and terrorists are our Viet Cong. We can bring 'em on, smoke 'em out and hunt 'em down from now until doomsday, but the line of committed volunteers seems only to grow longer. The world -- not just the Middle East, but South and Southeast Asia, Europe and North America -- is being populated with more and more alienated and bitter young Muslims who feel that they have nothing to lose. The ongoing U.S. military presence in Iraq and across the Middle East doesn't intimidate them; it just stokes their fury.

That there is no military solution to this conundrum is clearly illustrated by a ride I took on my first day in Baghdad. The small plane I flew on from Amman, Jordan, corkscrewed into Baghdad airport early one afternoon. The South African pilot warned the 20 passengers that the stomach-heaving descent might be uncomfortable, but that it was necessary in order to avoid any heat-seeking missiles. The last time I'd made such a landing was in April 1975, on a flight into Phnom Penh as a correspondent for The Washington Post. Two weeks later, Cambodia fell to the Khmer Rouge.

I was bound this time for the relative security of the walled-in Green Zone, just five miles from the airport. For security reasons, we could not leave immediately. I was assigned one of two dozen canvas cots in a large tent. It was air-conditioned. (This -- along with Internet availability, 30-minute-guaranteed to-your-tent-door Pizza Hut delivery, Cuban cigars at the PX, fresh meals and regularly sanitized portable toilets -- is one of the gains the U.S. military has achieved since Vietnam.) We weren't told our departure time.

At 3 a.m. a chipper sergeant with a bullhorn voice flicked on the tent lights and told us to get up and put on body armor and helmets. Three Rhino Runner buses, painted desert-tan and heavily steel-plated, were lined up and 90 of us, mostly GIs and civilian contractors, boarded. Three armed Humvees preceded us; three followed. Overhead clattered three Blackhawk helicopters.

Again I was reminded of Vietnam, where the GIs used to say that the night belonged to the VC. In Iraq, it's the roads -- where IEDs, or improvised explosive devices, have replaced punji sticks as the guerrilla weapon of choice. If, 2 1/2 years in, you don't control the only road linking your military airport to your headquarters, you don't control much of anything.

The next day, a U.S. Marine Corps brigadier general told a televised news conference that the escalating rate of car bombings in the capital and around the country was a sure sign of the enemy's "final desperation." (Two weeks later, Cheney issued his tweaked version.) The troops on the ground in Iraq, much like the grunts in Vietnam, know better. Yet by and large they're loyal, and most told me that they believe in the mission -- at least until they're ordered back for their second or third tours. These "stop loss" soldiers are most bitter about their perception that the administration's effort to wage the war on the cheap applies only to them, while private contractors grow rich.

On the green plastic wall of a portable toilet at Baghdad military airport, I read the following graffiti, scrawled by a civilian contract employee: "14 months. $200,000. I'm out of here. [Expletive] you Iraq." Beneath it was a response from the ranks: "12 months. $20,000. What the [expletive] is going on here?" Speaking of money, the administration has never come clean about the massive debt it's piling up for us and our descendants. The nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments estimates that the Vietnam War cost the United States $600 billion in today's dollars. Iraq, according to the center, is costing between $5 billion and $8 billion a month -- $218 billion to date. That would mean $700 billion if the guns fall silent six years from now, a modest timetable according to numerous military analysts. Other estimates predict an eventual bottom line of over $1 trillion.

So, do we cut our losses -- human and financial -- and leave? If so, when? If not, how long do we stay? If we stay, the insurgency continues; if we go, it most likely expands into an all-out civil war, the fragmenting of Iraq and the intervention of its neighbors, Iran, Turkey and Syria, followed by the collapse of promised democracy in the Middle East: a kind of reverse domino theory. What likely will happen in the short term, it's beginning to appear, will be an attempt to spin a more positive illusion: President Bush will order several thousand troops sent home in time for the 2006 midterm election campaign. He will claim that the Iraqis are taking charge of their own security (see "Vietnamization") and leave the mess to his successor.

Then what? If the bulk of the 130,000 U.S. troops are kept in Iraq for the rump of the Bush presidency and into the next administration, whether Republican or Democratic, the insurgency will go on.

The tax dollars we'll be spending on that military presence might be better spent on helping educate new generations of Iraqis, and millions of other young Muslims around the world, on the basics of running a country.They need it: "Democracy is wonderful," exclaimed a mother of two teenagers whom I met in the southern city of Basra. "It means you're free to do whatever you want." While that may be an understandable interpretation from a people who weren't free to do anything under Saddam Hussein's 35-year dictatorship, surely it's not what Americans are fighting and dying for.

The ultimate lesson of Vietnam -- one that is applicable to Iraq -- has been that once Americans declared victory and returned home, the Vietnamese went through the inevitable, sometimes brutal, shakeout that we had merely delayed. Eventually, the realities of the marketplace and the appeal of capitalism resulted in a nominally communist but vibrant nation. Today, Americans feast on low-cost Vietnamese shrimp and wear inexpensive Vietnamese T-shirts. Two month ago, President Bush welcomed Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to the White House and promised him increased trade and military cooperation.

So, what happens if we don't apply that lesson to our Iraq adventure? One of the most senior diplomats at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad told me that what he and his colleagues believed, and what kept them awake at night, was that if the United States is serious about establishing democracy in Iraq, and attempts to do so under current policies, it would take two generations of our soldiers fighting there. That's 40 years.

You may want to pass that along to your grandchildren.

Lewis Simons, a former foreign correspondent for The Post and for Knight Ridder newspapers, is a contributor to National Geographic.

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/29/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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Friday, August 26, 2005

Don't Stop Giving Change to Beggars

Like all the other money making, law abiding fellow citizens with sizable income, I get a bit of nervous seeing haggard looking panhandlers with disheveled hair, out of season long coats, black and white stubbles in cheeks waiting at the corner street. Like all the other good natured folks of our civilized society I take a detour seeing a malnourished woman with wild look in her eyes due to lack of sleep or "God" knows what, moving quickly on the sidewalks, averting gaze in determined efforts. Like all the other hypocrites of our world, I answer back to a heart-felt plea, "Sorry, no change", stopping the clink-clank sound of coins hidden deep in my pocket, and take long strides away from the visible manifestation of poverty, walking and standing in human flesh right in front of my eyes.

I take a deep sip from the frothy green tea frappuccino, pondering so amusingly the well-being of our world, the grandiose theory of universe, the war, the protests, politics, and the everyday injustices scattered around everywhere the eye can see without giving a hoot to my own complicity.

No wonder the world is in such a mess!

Regards,
Sohel


Don't stop giving change to beggars
By Reggie Rivers
DenverPost.com

I give money to panhandlers. It's not part of my daily routine, but every now and then, a homeless person will be in my line of sight when I'm feeling generous, and I'll hand him or her a couple of bucks.

I don't have any expectations about how the recipient will spend the money. Maybe he'll buy food. Maybe he's saving for a bus trip to another city. Maybe he'll use the money to pay for lodging. Or maybe he'll just buy booze. It doesn't matter to me. I give him money because I can see he needs it.

Last week, a study commissioned by the Downtown Denver Business Improvement District and the city's Office of Economic Development revealed that 44 percent of Denver residents are like me. Our occasional giving adds up to about $25 a year for each of us, which totals about $4.6 million a year to panhandlers.

Denver business leaders and city officials want us to stop. They say, with a straight face, that they care about panhandlers and that our impromptu donations only perpetuate the problems that beggars face. They say panhandlers need tough love if they're going to rise out of poverty. They point to the city's proposed $122 million, 10-year proposal to end homelessness, and suggest redirecting our $4.6 million a year in donations could significantly help fund this program.

With all due respect, I doubt that this study was motivated by humanitarian ideals. Business bureaus and economic development offices typically don't spend time trying to cure the complex problems of poverty, homelessness and panhandling. The objective was to figure out how to keep unattractive, malodorous, poor beggars from driving away tourists and other customers.

And I imagine their concerns are well-founded. There are many people who get nervous and/or scared when they see panhandlers, and they might avoid a shop that had a lot of beggars out front. But I'm not going to stop making my occasional donations to people on street corners.

Panhandlers play an important role in our society, because they are the visible face of poverty. The study in question focused on Denver residents, but a large percentage of middle- and upper-income families in the metro area live in suburban enclaves that are completely devoid of poverty. The tight restrictions of homeowner associations ensure that blight doesn't exist, and the cost of mortgages, HOA dues, assessments and mandatory repairs make it virtually impossible to maintain a home in these neighborhoods without a substantial income.

So if you live in a poverty-free area, drive on highways crowded with your peers, work in an office building full of successful people, and never see anyone on the low end of the economy, it would be easy to forget that poor people exist and that homelessness is a significant issue in Denver.

The suggestion that our $4.6 million in donations would be better spent on other programs is true, but irrelevant. I donate money to many charities, but these impromptu donations wouldn't exist if not for panhandlers. Beggars provoke impulsive contributions in the same way that tabloids near checkout counters provoke impulse buys.

Rather than asking us to boycott panhandlers, business and city leaders should think seriously about what they can do to reduce the social problems that contribute to panhandling. I don't know how much money they spent on this survey, but if their goal was to help the poor, the money could have been better spent by donating it to a program.

If you give money to panhandlers, don't stop. They're not getting rich off your donations, but they are serving a purpose. We shouldn't push the poor out of sight; we should push them out of poverty.

Former Bronco Reggie Rivers is the host of "Drawing the Line" Wednesdays at 8 p.m. on KBDI-Channel 12.

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/26/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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Wednesday, August 24, 2005

E-mail addiction

Now there is a food for thought while Googling more info about it!

Regards,
Sohel

E-mail addiction

By Robert Kuttner | August 24, 2005

I RECENTLY took a short vacation. The very best thing about it was not the lovely walks, the concerts, the tennis, or just lazing and reading. The best thing was being away from e-mail. (And the worst thing was coming back to 482 messages.)

The stuff is like kudzu. I'm not even talking about spam -- the unwanted commercial solicitations for everything from penis enlargements to Nigerian banking scams.

Nor am I complaining about reader responses to my column, which I appreciate. If I weren't reading electronic comments, I'd be absorbing old-fashioned letters.

No, I'm referring to everyday e-mail from people I know -- co-workers, friends, and acquaintances who assume that e-mail is what we do all day.

I find it appalling to sometimes get responses within a minute or two of sending a message. This suggests that the recipient is compulsively checking e-mail all the time. How can these people get any work done? Don't they have anything better to do?

We are becoming a nation of attention-deficit addicts thanks to e-mail. If you are at all prone to procrastination or short attention span, e-mail is the devil's instrument. At the drop of a hat, you can distract yourself and pretend to be doing something productive.

All serious work requires concentration. I don't know about you, but I have two kinds of days. The productive days are the ones when I manage to resist the temptation to check e-mail more than a few times. I actually get things accomplished. The utterly wasted ones are those when I check e-mail every little while. The distraction feeds on itself. You feel busy, and an entire day can go by without getting anything done.

(Excuse me, I have to check e-mail. Ahhh . . . now, where was I?)

E-mail is a time thief. And I'm not even talking about all the other temptations of the Internet, from checking your favorite blog every few minutes, to compulsive Googling, chat rooms, video games, or cyber-porn.

Some people are so tightly scheduled that they don't have time for frequent e-mail breaks -- doctors or schoolteachers, for instance. But these folks aren't home free either. Because of the ubiquity of e-mail that demands responses, they are the poor souls whose mail is logged at 11:52 p.m. or 5:38 in the morning.

Looking at recent e-mails, I can find chains of messages where colleagues and I e-mailed back and forth five or six times to resolve a minor question. This is idiotic.

Remember phones? They're often far more efficient. Questions can be settled on the spot, and the telephone has the further virtue of requiring us to listen to each other, to the tonalities as well as the content. In many ways, the phone is a more advanced form of communication than e-mail because conversation occurs in real time. Imagine that.

E-mail foments multiple discourtesies that are also inefficient. I find that people don't read e-mail messages very carefully (they are too busy skimming the other piled-up messages). People often bang out responses that create hurt feelings and needlessly magnify conflicts. People are cavalier about forwarding e-mail, too, which creates other conflicts. And, because of the universal e-mail excess, we find ourselves trying to do other things while catching up with e-mail.

How many times have you been on a phone call, where long lapses occur on the other end or you are asked to repeat something that was perfectly clear? Granted, checking e-mail while ostensibly participating in a phone call or meeting is not a mortal multitasking sin like, say, thinking about your grocery list while making love. But it isn't polite, and it doesn't exactly improve communication.

E-mail is so facile that it flatters us into thinking we can conduct more relationships -- social, vocational, random--than anyone can competently handle.

For more than a decade, economists have puzzled at the fact that computers were everywhere, making the economy more productive, but that measured productivity wasn't increasing as much as expected. A prime suspect is e-mail proliferation. Computers steal almost as much productivity as they enhance.

So let's admit we have a problem, stop sending so many messages, not respond so instantly, and abstain from cyber-compulsion. We need a 12-step program for e-mail addicts.

Come to think of it, they probably have one on the Internet. Pardon me a moment while I Google it.


Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/24/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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Monday, August 22, 2005

Why Profiling Won't Work

Profiling won't work. If the purpose of profiling is to prevent terrorism, profiling will only make more humiliation for Muslims who doesn't have the white skin, but who are law abiding citizens. Profiling will make it easier for the terrorists to adapt to new techniques where they can take advantage of ridiculously narrow security scope, and go for the kill from outside the normal views of how a Muslim looks like. Also, presupposition and prejudging are synonymous to prejudice in this regard, that will surely alienate an entire peaceful community. That may also give other competing groups, who may have resources or accolades to gain, to shift blame on the easy scape-goat of our days, the Muslims. It would be a scary world, indeed, where crimes of any proportions could be committed and all one has to do is put the blame on the easy target. History has some precedents.

William Raspberry puts it succinctly: "Stop me once because someone fitting my description or driving a car like mine is a suspect in a crime and I shrug and comply. Stop me repeatedly because of how I look and I respond with less and less grace. Am I arguing against all efforts to protect America from terrorism? Of course not. But since Americans look all sorts of ways, a more sensible way of deciding who gets extra attention is behavior."

Regards,
Sohel


Why Profiling Won't Work

By William Raspberry

Monday, August 22, 2005; Page A17

The Transportation Security Administration, having rendered cockpit crews less vulnerable to hijackers by strengthening the cockpit doors, is now (1) reviewing its list of items passengers may not bring aboard, (2) proposing to minimize the number of passengers who have to be patted down at checkpoints and (3) taking another look at the rule that requires most passengers to remove their shoes.

These are encouraging moves toward common sense.



This isn't: A gaggle of voices is proposing -- almost as though responding to the same memo from some malign Mr. Big -- that the TSA replace its present policy of random searches with massive racial and ethnic profiling.

After all, they argue, weren't the Sept. 11 terrorists all young Muslim men? Isn't it likely that the next terrorist attack will be carried out by young Muslim men? So why waste time screening white-haired grandmothers and blue-suited white guys? Much more efficient to tap the shoulder of any young man who looks Muslim -- a category that covers not just Arabs but also Asians, Africans and, increasingly, African Americans.

It must have been just such sweet reason that led to the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans during World War II. Even Andrew C. McCarthy of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies -- and one of the advocates of profiling -- acknowledges that the Japanese internments were excessive. But only, he says in the current issue of National Review, because "they included American citizens of Japanese descent; there was nothing objectionable in principle about holding Japanese, German, or Italian nationals."

That distinction doesn't hold up in the case of airport profiling, since there's no way visually to distinguish between a Saudi citizen and an Arab American. The profilers wouldn't even try.

Actually, anyone who's ever been inconvenienced by security checks -- whether as trivial as having to give up a fingernail clipper or as serious as having to take a later flight -- will see some merit in the case for profiling. Can't they see that I'm just a guy trying to get from here to there, while that fellow over there looks like he could be a hijacker?

One trouble with that line is that the obviously innocent tend to look a lot like ourselves, while the clearly suspect tend to look like the other fellow. Which is why so many Middle Eastern-looking men (and Sikhs) were stopped and frisked in the days just after Sept. 11 -- and why at least one member of President Bush's Secret Service detail was thrown off an airliner.

The other, more serious problem is that the pro-profilers are fighting the last war. If someone had stopped 19 young Muslim men from boarding four jetliners four years ago, Sept. 11 wouldn't have happened. Therefore, security requires that we make it difficult for young Muslim men to board jetliners. It's as though white people come in all sizes, ages and predispositions, while young Arab men are fungible.

Random checks at least have the virtue of rendering us all equal. I can talk with any fellow passenger about the absurdity of having to remove my loafers, because that fellow passenger has been similarly inconvenienced. But with whom does a young Arab (or Turk or dreadlocked college student) share his humiliation?

And make no mistake, it is humiliating. Stop me once because someone fitting my description or driving a car like mine is a suspect in a crime and I shrug and comply. Stop me repeatedly because of how I look and I respond with less and less grace.

Am I arguing against all efforts to protect America from terrorism? Of course not. But since Americans look all sorts of ways, a more sensible way of deciding who gets extra attention is behavior.

The profilers say this is just political correctness gone mad. McCarthy puts it bluntly: "Until we stop pretending not to see what the terrorists who are attacking us look like, we may as well give them an engraved invitation to strike again."

Well, we do know what they look like. They look like the 19 hijackers of Sept. 11, but they also look like Richard "Shoe Bomber" Reid, John Walker Lindh, Jose Padilla and -- don't forget -- Timothy McVeigh.

Profile that.

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/22/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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In Explaining Life's Complexity, Darwinists and Doubters Clash

Dr. Behe will wait and see whether the observed bacteria in Dr. Lenski's lab produces any dramatic leap in its evolutionary steps, but the bacteria is already showing "a pretty dramatic exception, one where a new and surprising function has evolved", could this count as the triumph of science over religion?

Why is it necessary to invest millions if not more by Discovery Institute and such for their only passion in disproving the well-established evolutionary science? Could these resources be better used in original research like fighting countless diseases?

As time progresses, more new discoveries, inventions will be made, we may even see evolution in new light. But can absolute faith based religious dogma bring any benefits to science? Surely, dogma of any sorts should be taken with a grain of salt, may that be religious one, or a "well-established" scientific one. Even in time, Darwinism's many aspects may come into more rigorous investigations or even refutations by future researchers, however, these refutations, if any, will come from scientists wearing authentic lab coats, not disguised clergies in white aprons, unless the supposed "Designer" changes his or her (Its) "mind", and decide to come down from "Heaven" to this disperate earth of ours for a friendly chat with doubters and believers of all sorts.

Regards,
Sohel

In Explaining Life's Complexity, Darwinists and Doubters Clash

By KENNETH CHANG

At the heart of the debate over intelligent design is this question: Can a scientific explanation of the history of life include the actions of an unseen higher being?

The proponents of intelligent design, a school of thought that some have argued should be taught alongside evolution in the nation's schools, say that the complexity and diversity of life go beyond what evolution can explain.

Biological marvels like the optical precision of an eye, the little spinning motors that propel bacteria and the cascade of proteins that cause blood to clot, they say, point to the hand of a higher being at work in the world.

In one often-cited argument, Michael J. Behe, a professor of biochemistry at Lehigh University and a leading design theorist, compares complex biological phenomena like blood clotting to a mousetrap: Take away any one piece - the spring, the baseboard, the metal piece that snags the mouse - and the mousetrap stops being able to catch mice.

Similarly, Dr. Behe argues, if any one of the more than 20 proteins involved in blood clotting is missing or deficient, as happens in hemophilia, for instance, clots will not form properly.

Such all-or-none systems, Dr. Behe and other design proponents say, could not have arisen through the incremental changes that evolution says allowed life to progress to the big brains and the sophisticated abilities of humans from primitive bacteria.

These complex systems are "always associated with design," Dr. Behe, the author of the 1996 book "Darwin's Black Box," said in an interview. "We find such systems in biology, and since we know of no other way that these things can be produced, Darwinian claims notwithstanding, then we are rational to conclude they were indeed designed."

It is an argument that appeals to many Americans of faith.

But mainstream scientists say that the claims of intelligent design run counter to a century of research supporting the explanatory and predictive power of Darwinian evolution, and that the design approach suffers from fundamental problems that place it outside the realm of science. For one thing, these scientists say, invoking a higher being as an explanation is unscientific.

"One of the rules of science is, no miracles allowed," said Douglas H. Erwin, a paleobiologist at the Smithsonian Institution. "That's a fundamental presumption of what we do."

That does not mean that scientists do not believe in God. Many do. But they see science as an effort to find out how the material world works, with nothing to say about why we are here or how we should live.

And in that quest, they say, there is no need to resort to otherworldly explanations. So much evidence has been provided by evolutionary studies that biologists are able to explain even the most complex natural phenomena and to fill in whatever blanks remain with solid theories.

This is possible, in large part, because evolution leaves tracks like the fossil remains of early animals or the chemical footprints in DNA that have been revealed by genetic research.

For example, while Dr. Behe and other leading design proponents see the blood clotting system as a product of design, mainstream scientists see it as a result of a coherent sequence of evolutionary events.

Early vertebrates like jawless fish had a simple clotting system, scientists believe, involving a few proteins that made blood stick together, said Russell F. Doolittle, a professor of molecular biology at the University of California, San Diego.

Scientists hypothesize that at some point, a mistake during the copying of DNA resulted in the duplication of a gene, increasing the amount of protein produced by cells.

Most often, such a change would be useless. But in this case the extra protein helped blood clot, and animals with the extra protein were more likely to survive and reproduce. Over time, as higher-order species evolved, other proteins joined the clotting system. For instance, several proteins involved in the clotting of blood appear to have started as digestive enzymes.

By studying the evolutionary tree and the genetics and biochemistry of living organisms, Dr. Doolittle said, scientists have largely been able to determine the order in which different proteins became involved in helping blood clot, eventually producing the sophisticated clotting mechanisms of humans and other higher animals. The sequencing of animal genomes has provided evidence to support this view.

For example, scientists had predicted that more primitive animals such as fish would be missing certain blood-clotting proteins. In fact, the recent sequencing of the fish genome has shown just this.

"The evidence is rock solid," Dr. Doolittle said.

Intelligent design proponents have advanced their views in books for popular audiences and in a few scientific articles. Some have developed mathematical formulas intended to tell whether something was designed or formed by natural processes.

Mainstream scientists say that intelligent design represents a more sophisticated - and thus more seductive - attack on evolution. Unlike creationists, design proponents accept many of the conclusions of modern science. They agree with cosmologists that the age of the universe is 13.6 billion years, not fewer than 10,000 years, as a literal reading of the Bible would suggest. They accept that mutation and natural selection, the central mechanisms of evolution, have acted on the natural world in small ways, for example, leading to the decay of eyes in certain salamanders that live underground.

Some intelligent design advocates even accept common descent, the notion that all species came from a common ancestor, a central tenet of evolution.

Although a vast majority of scientists accept evolution, the Discovery Institute, a research group in Seattle that has emerged as a clearinghouse for the intelligent design movement, says that 404 scientists, including 70 biologists, have signed a petition saying they are skeptical of Darwinism.

Nonetheless, many scientists regard intelligent design as little more than creationism dressed up in pseudoscientific clothing. Despite its use of scientific language and the fact that some design advocates are scientists, they say, the design approach has so far offered only philosophical objections to evolution, not any positive evidence for the intervention of a designer.

'Truncated View of Reality'

If Dr. Behe's mousetrap is one of the most familiar arguments for design, another is the idea that intelligence is obvious in what it creates. Read a novel by Hemingway, gaze at the pyramids, and a designer's hand is manifest, design proponents say.

But mainstream scientists, design proponents say, are unwilling to look beyond the material world when it comes to explaining things like the construction of an eye or the spinning motors that propel bacteria. What is wrong, they ask, with entertaining the idea that what looks like it was designed was actually designed?

"If we've defined science such that it cannot get to the true answer, we've got a pretty lame definition of science," said Douglas D. Axe, a molecular biologist and the director of research at the Biologic Institute, a new research center in Seattle that looks at the organization of biological systems, including intelligent design issues. Dr. Axe said he had received "significant" financing from the Discovery Institute, but he declined to give any other details about the institute or its financing.

Stephen C. Meyer, director of the Center for Science and Culture at the Discovery Institute, compares the design approach to the work of archaeologists investigating an ancient civilization.

"Imagine you're an archaeologist and you're looking at an inscription, and you say, 'Well, sorry, that looks like it's intelligent but we can't invoke an intelligent cause because, as a matter of method, we have to limit ourselves to materialistic processes,' " Dr. Meyer said. "That would be nuts."

He added, "Call it miracle, call it some other pejorative term, but the fact remains that the materialistic view is a truncated view of reality."

William Paley, an Anglican priest, made a similar argument in the early 19th century. Someone who finds a rock can easily imagine how wind and rain shaped it, he reasoned. But someone who finds a pocket watch lying on the ground instantly knows that it was not formed by natural processes.

With living organisms so much more complicated than watches, he wrote, "The marks of design are too strong to be got over."

Mainstream scientists say that the scientific method is indeed restricted to the material world, because it is trying to find out how it works. Simply saying, "it must have been designed," they say, is simply a way of not tackling the hardest problems.

They say they have no disagreement with studying phenomena for which there are, as yet, no explanations.

It is the presumption of a designer that mainstream scientists dispute, because there are no artifacts or biological signs - no scientific evidence, in other words - to suggest a designer's presence.

Darwin's theory, in contrast, has over the last century yielded so many solid findings that no mainstream biologist today doubts its basic tenets, though they may argue about particulars.

The theory has unlocked many of the mysteries of the natural world. For example, by studying the skeletons of whales, evolutionary scientists have been able to trace the history of their descent from small-hoofed land mammals. They made predictions about what the earliest water-dwelling whales might look like. And, in 1994, paleontologists reported discovering two such species, with many of the anatomical features that scientists had predicted.

Darwin's Finches

Nowhere has evolution been more powerful than in its prediction that there must be a means to pass on information from one generation to another. Darwin did not know the biological mechanism of inheritance, but the theory of evolution required one.

The discovery of DNA, the sequencing of the human genome, the pinpointing of genetic diseases and the discovery that a continuum of life from a single cell to a human brain can be detected in DNA are all a result of evolutionary theory.

Darwin may have been the classic scientific observer. He observed that individuals in a given species varied considerably, variations now known to be caused by mutations in their genetic code. He also realized that constraints of food and habitat sharply limited population growth; not every individual could survive and reproduce.

This competition, he hypothesized, meant that those individuals with helpful traits multiplied, passing on those traits to their numerous offspring. Negative or useless traits did not help individuals reproduce, and those traits faded away, a process that Darwin called natural selection.

The finches that Darwin observed in the Galápagos Islands provide the most famous example of this process. The species of finch that originally found its way to the Galápagos from South America had a beak shaped in a way that was ideal for eating seeds. But once arrived on the islands, that finch eventually diversified into 13 species. The various Galápagos finches have differently shaped beaks, each fine-tuned to take advantage of a particular food, like fruit, grubs, buds or seeds.

Such small adaptations can arise within a few generations. Darwin surmised that over millions of years, these small changes would accumulate, giving rise to the myriad of species seen today.

The number of organisms that, in those long periods, ended up being preserved as fossils is infinitesimal. As a result, the evolutionary record - the fossils of long-extinct organisms found preserved in rock - is necessarily incomplete, and some species appear to burst out of nowhere.

Some supporters of intelligent design have argued that such gaps undermine the evidence for evolution.

For instance, during the Cambrian explosion a half a billion years ago, life diversified to shapes with limbs and shells from jellyfish-like blobs, over a geologically brief span of 30 million years.

Dr. Meyer sees design at work in these large leaps, which signified the appearance of most modern forms of life. He argues that genetic mutations do not have the power to create new shapes of animals.

But molecular biologists have found genes that control the function of other genes, switching them on and off. Small mutations in these controller genes could produce new species. In addition, new fossils are being found and scientists now know that many changes occurred in the era before the Cambrian - a period that may have lasted 100 million years - providing more time for change.

The Cambrian explosion, said David J. Bottjer, a professor of earth sciences at the University of Southern California and president of the Paleontological Society, is "a wonderful mystery in that we don't know everything yet."

"I think it will be just a matter of time before smart people will be able to figure a lot more of this out," Dr. Bottjer said. "Like any good scientific problem."

Purposeful Patterns

Intelligent design proponents have been stung by claims that, in contrast to mainstream scientists, they do not form their own theories or conduct original research. They say they are doing the mathematical work and biological experiments needed to put their ideas on firm scientific ground.

For example, William A. Dembski, a mathematician who drew attention when he headed a short-lived intelligent design institute at Baylor University, has worked on mathematical algorithms that purport to tell the difference between objects that were designed and those that occurred naturally.

Dr. Dembski says designed objects, like Mount Rushmore, show complex, purposeful patterns that evince the existence of intelligence. Mathematical calculations like those he has developed, he argues, could detect those patterns, for example, distinguishing Mount Rushmore from Mount St. Helens.

But other mathematicians have said that Dr. Dembski's calculations do not work and cannot be applied in the real world.

Other studies that intelligent design theorists cite in support of their views have been done by Dr. Axe of the Biologic Institute.

In one such study, Dr. Axe looked at a protein, called penicillinase, that gives bacteria the ability to survive treatment with the antibiotic penicillin. Dr. Meyer, of the Discovery Institute, has referred to Dr. Axe's work in arguing that working proteins are so rare that evolution cannot by chance discover them.

What was the probability, Dr. Axe asked in his study, of a protein with this ability existing in the universe of all possible proteins?

Penicillinase is made up of a strand of chemicals called amino acids folded into a shape that binds to penicillin and thus disables it. Whether the protein folds up in the right way determines whether it works or not.

Dr. Axe calculated that of the plausible amino acid sequences, only one in 100,000 trillion trillion trillion trillion trillion trillion - a number written as 1 followed by 77 zeroes - would provide resistance to penicillin.

In other words, the probability was essentially zero.

Dr. Axe's research appeared last year in The Journal of Molecular Biology, a peer-reviewed scientific publication.

Dr. Kenneth R. Miller, a professor of biology at Brown University and a frequent sparring partner of design proponents, said that in his study, Dr. Axe did not look at penicillinase "the way evolution looks at the protein."

Natural selection, he said, is not random. A small number of mutations, sometimes just one, can change the function of a protein, allowing it to diverge along new evolutionary paths and eventually form a new shape or fold.

One Shot or a Continual Act

Intelligent design proponents are careful to say that they cannot identify the designer at work in the world, although most readily concede that God is the most likely possibility. And they offer varied opinions on when and how often a designer intervened.

Dr. Behe, for example, said he could imagine that, like an elaborate billiards shot, the design was set up when the Big Bang occurred 13.6 billion years ago. "It could have all been programmed into the universe as far as I'm concerned," he said.

But it was also possible, Dr. Behe added, that a designer acted continually throughout the history of life.

Mainstream scientists say this fuzziness about when and how design supposedly occurred makes the claims impossible to disprove. It is unreasonable, they say, for design advocates to demand that every detail of evolution be filled in.

Dr. Behe, however, said he might find it compelling if scientists were to observe evolutionary leaps in the laboratory. He pointed to an experiment by Richard E. Lenski, a professor of microbial ecology at Michigan State University, who has been observing the evolution of E. coli bacteria for more than 15 years. "If anything cool came out of that," Dr. Behe said, "that would be one way to convince me."

Dr. Behe said that if he was correct, then the E. coli in Dr. Lenski's lab would evolve in small ways but never change in such a way that the bacteria would develop entirely new abilities.

In fact, such an ability seems to have developed. Dr. Lenski said his experiment was not intended to explore this aspect of evolution, but nonetheless, "We have recently discovered a pretty dramatic exception, one where a new and surprising function has evolved," he said.

Dr. Lenski declined to give any details until the research is published. But, he said, "If anyone is resting his or her faith in God on the outcome that our experiment will not produce some major biological innovation, then I humbly suggest they should rethink the distinction between science and religion."

Dr. Behe said, "I'll wait and see."

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/22/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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Sunday, August 21, 2005

The Trade-And-Aid Myth

Paul Wolfowitz, the new President of the World Bank just visted Bangladesh yesterday. Setting aside his notorious involvement in gone-awry Iraq war, his few observations on the prospect of achieving 8 percent GDP in Bangladesh but only if Bangladeshi government takes sincere initiatives reducing endemic corruption hit the mark. Here are a few extracts of Mr. Wolfowitz's comment:

"I am absolutely convinced that you have the same great human resources here that your big neighbour in the west has. You have wonderful, talented people. But the problem of corruption is a big drag on your economy. Big power projects unfortunately are one of the principal targets for corruption," he cited as an example. This sector needs reform, he pointed out, adding, "We are not imposing harsh conditions... We are just saying we invest in your country and we need some assurance that the investment would go to help the poor people." Wolfowitz said the WB's future aid for projects including those in the power sector would depend on reducing corruption, because "we cannot commit money unless we are convinced it is going to be spent in the right way." [The Daily Star, August 22, 2005]


Compare Mr. Wolfowitz's comment with Professor Dani Rodrik's article published in Tom Paine a few weeks ago. He provides a few practical examples where the progress of nations toward more economic success came through their own efforts, including curbing corruptions and crimes, whereas in nations where even having the richest and the most powerful country in the world as the neighbor and getting the most favored trading partner treatment is no guarantee to achieve similar economic success.

"Development should focus not on trade and aid, but on improving the policy environment in poor countries." How would they do it? Perhaps witholding any material and immaterial support from the corrupt regimes around the world could do the trick. And of course, steering away the powerful nations' own corrupted corporations from meddling into the corrupting process itself could be the final nail on the coffin. The memory of the energy Minister of Bangladesh who resigned in June of this year for getting an expensive car from an oil exploration company is still too raw to forget for many. Bangladesh or other poor nations cannot solve these widespread corruption processes alone, these have to be done in coordinated fashion, from East to West, North to South, without prejudice.

Regards,
Sohel

The Trade-And-Aid Myth

Dani Rodrik

Dani Rodrik is Professor of Political Economy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.



Trade and aid have become international buzzwords. More aid (including debt relief) and greater access to rich countries’ markets for poor countries’ products now appears to be at the top of the global agenda. Indeed, the debate nowadays is not about what to do, but how much to do, and how fast.

Lost in all this are the clear lessons of the last five decades of economic development. Foremost among these is that economic development is largely in the hands of poor nations themselves. Countries that have done well in the recent past have done so through their own efforts. Aid and market access have rarely played a critical role.

Consider a developing country that has free and preferential market access to its largest neighbor, which also happens to be the world’s most powerful economy. Suppose, in addition, that this country is able to send millions of its citizens to work across the border, receives a huge volume of inward investment, and is totally integrated into international production chains. Moreover, the country’s banking system is supported by its rich neighbor’s demonstrated willingness to act as a lender of last resort. Globalization does not get much better than this, right?

Now consider a second country. This one faces a trade embargo in the world’s largest market, receives neither foreign aid nor any other kind of assistance from the West, is excluded from international organizations like the World Trade Organization, and is prevented from borrowing from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. If these external disadvantages are not debilitating enough, this economy also maintains its own high barriers on international trade (in the form of state trading, import tariffs, and quantitative restrictions).

As the reader may have guessed, these are real countries: Mexico and Vietnam. Mexico shares a 2,000-mile long border with the United States, which provides not only privileged market access in goods and labor, but also a claim to the resources of the U.S. Treasury (as became apparent during the 1995 peso crisis).



By contrast, America maintained a trade embargo against Vietnam until 1994, established diplomatic relations only in 1995, and did not provide most-favored nation treatment to Vietnamese imports for years after that. Vietnam still remains outside the WTO.

Now consider their economic performance. Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in December 1992, Mexico’s economy has grown at an average annual rate of barely over one percent in per capita terms. This is not only far below the rates of Asia’s economic superstars; it is also a fraction of Mexico’s own growth performance during the decades that preceded the debt crisis of 1982 (3.6 percent per year between 1960 and 1981).

Vietnam, however, grew at an annual rate of 5.6 percent per capita between the onset of its economic reforms in 1988 and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1995, and has continued to grow at a rapid 4.5 percent pace since then. Vietnam witnessed a dramatic fall in poverty, while in Mexico real wages fell. Both countries experienced sharp increases in international trade and foreign investment, but the pictures are utterly different where it counts most: rising standards of living, particularly for the poor.

What these examples show is that domestic efforts trump everything else in determining a country’s economic fortunes. All the opportunities that the U.S. market presented to Mexico could not offset the consequences of policy mistakes at home, especially the failure to reverse the real appreciation of the peso’s exchange rate and the inability to extend the productivity gains achieved in a narrow range of export activities to the rest of the economy.

What matters most is whether a country adopts the right growth strategy. With none of Mexico’s advantages, Vietnam pursued a strategy that focused on diversifying its economy and enhancing the productive capacity of domestic suppliers.

Broader post-war experience supports the conclusion that domestic policies are what matter most. South Korea took off in the early 1960’s not when foreign aid was at its apex, but when it was being phased out. Taiwan did not receive foreign aid or preferential market access. China and India, today’s two economic superstars, have prospered largely through sui generis reform efforts.

It is tempting to ascribe the rare African successes—Botswana and Mauritius—to foreign demand for their exports (diamonds and garments, respectively), but that story goes only so far. Obviously, both countries would be considerably poorer without access to foreign markets. But, as in other cases of successful development, what distinguishes them is not the external advantages they possess, but their ability to exploit these advantages.

Witness the mess that other countries made of their natural-resource endowments. The word “diamond” hardly conjures images of peace and prosperity in Sierra Leone. Similarly, few of the export processing zones proliferating around the world have delivered the results observed in Mauritius.

None of this absolves rich countries of their responsibility to help. They can make the world less hospitable for corrupt dictators—for example, by greater sharing of financial information and by not recognizing the international contracts that they sign. Similarly, increasing the number of poor-country workers allowed to work in rich countries, and providing greater scope for growth-oriented policies by relaxing WTO rules and conditionality from the United States, would produce greater long-term development impact.

It is far from clear that expanding market access and boosting aid are the most productive use of valuable political capital in the North. Development should focus not on trade and aid, but on improving the policy environment in poor countries.

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/21/2005 2 comments: Links to this post
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What's in A Name? Ask This Traveler

What's in a name? It's probably everything. In a world where frenzy over (holy) ghosts, live gremlins and red eyed daemons abundant through our inundation from political dosages outpouring from news media extravaganza, and also the real violators of peace, following religious or markental creed, your "exotic" name associating with any particular ethnic group (Muslim) could be a real bad thing of our day. You may want "to scream, to jump on a chair and shout: "I'm an American citizen; a novelist; I probably teach English literature to your children." But again, think twice, it may all count against you, in this prejudged (preemptive) environment of ours.

You may change your name. But your identity remains the same. "Absolutely nothing" you can do shall be the matter of importance.

You feel you have complete control over your life? Think again.

Regards,
Sohel



What's in A Name? Ask This Traveler

By Diana Abu-Jaber
Saturday, August 20, 2005; A17

My heart plummeted when the man at the immigration counter gestured to the back room. I'm an American born and raised, and this was Miami, where I live, but they weren't quite ready to let me in yet.

"Please wait in here, Ms. Abu-Jaber," the immigration officer said. My husband, with his very American last name, accompanied me. He was getting used to this. The same thing had happened recently in Canada when I'd flown to Montreal to speak at a book event. That time they held me for 45 minutes. Today we were returning from a literary festival in Jamaica, and I was startled that I was being sent "in back" once again.

The officer behind the counter called me up and said, "Miss, your name looks like the name of someone who's on our wanted list. We're going to have to check you out with Washington."

"How long will it take?"

"Hard to say . . . a few minutes," he said. "We'll call you when we're ready for you."

After an hour, Washington still hadn't decided anything about me. "Isn't this computerized?" I asked at the counter. "Can't you just look me up?"

Just a few more minutes, they assured me.

After an hour and a half, I pulled my cell phone out to call the friends I was supposed to meet that evening. An officer rushed over. "No phones!" he said. "For all we know you could be calling a terrorist cell and giving them information."

"I'm just a university professor," I said. My voice came out in a squeak.

"Of course you are. And we take people like you out of here in leg irons every day."

I put my phone away.

My husband and I were getting hungry and tired. Whole families had been brought into the waiting room, and the place was packed with hyper children, exhausted parents, even a flight attendant. Scanning the room, I realized that the place resembled a modern Ellis Island. But when my father immigrated to this country from Jordan more than 45 years ago, he didn't have any trouble. "They let me right in," he said. "One of them wanted me to change my name, but I stuck to Ghassan Abu-Jaber!"

Forty-five years later, I was stuck on the border. Something in me snapped. "There isn't any legitimate reason that you've sent me here -- it's just because of my name! You just grab anyone named Abu-Jaber or Abdul-Rahman or Al-Hussain! Isn't that right?" The man smiled blankly. "I'm not at liberty to discuss this case," he said.

I wanted to scream, to jump on a chair and shout: "I'm an American citizen; a novelist; I probably teach English literature to your children." Or would that all be counted against me?

After two hours in detention, I was approached by one of the officers. "You're free to go," he said. No explanations or apologies. For a moment, neither of us moved, we were still in shock. Then we leaped to our feet.

"Oh, one more thing." He handed me a tattered photocopy with an address on it. "If you weren't happy with your treatment, you can write to this agency."

"Will they respond?" I asked.

"I don't know -- I don't know of anyone who's ever written to them before." Then he added, "By the way, this will probably keep happening each time you travel internationally."

"What can I do to keep it from happening again?"

He smiled the empty smile we'd seen all day. "Absolutely nothing."

After telling several friends about our ordeal, probably the most frequent advice I've heard in response is to change my name. Twenty years ago, my own graduate school writing professor advised me to write under a nom de plume so that publishers wouldn't stick me in what he called "the ethnic ghetto" -- a separate, secondary shelf in the bookstore. But a name is an integral part of anyone's personal and professional identity -- just like the town you're born in and the place you're raised.

Like my father, I'll keep the name, but my airport experience has given me a whole new perspective on what diversity and tolerance are supposed to mean. We're told that these heightened security measures are intended to keep us safe. Instead, what seems to be happening is that we're kept in a state of heightened anxiety, trying desperately to separate "us" from "them," when in fact, there can be no separation. The world is a place of nuance, flux, hardship and complexity: We all live together in it. The real safety will come from learning how to live together better, not from trying to push others out.

I had no idea that being an American would ever be this hard.

Diana Abu-Jaber is a novelist.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/19/AR2005081901459.html

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/21/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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The man who would be king

The man who would be king

For 20 years, Garry Kasparov remained virtually unbeaten on the chess board. Now he's planning his most audacious move ever - to topple Vladimir Putin. Andrew Anthony reports on the opening game of his political campaign

Sunday August 21, 2005

Garry Kasparov is currently putting the finishing touches to a book with the provisional title How Life Imitates Chess. As he is almost certainly the greatest chess player in history, nobody can doubt his authority concerning the board game. But it's on the broader matter of life where questions of expertise might be raised. For while professional chess players may understand the black-and-white world of the chess board, they are not renowned for their competence in negotiating the grey uncertainties of everyday existence.

We think of Bobby Fischer, the paranoid anti-Semite raging at imagined enemies, or Paul Morphy, the 19th-century champion, found dead in his bath surrounded by women's shoes. We recall Wilhelm Steinitz, the Austrian who thought he was in electrical communication with God. Even 'normal' professionals, like our own Nigel Short and Jonathan Speelman, tend to betray curious eccentricities. Short speaks English as though it were a foreign language and Speelman looks, in his clothes and grooming, like a mad professor plotting to blow up the world.

It should be said in his defence that Kasparov, though a genius at the game, has never particularly looked the part. Whereas Anatoly Karpov, the man he beat to take the world title back in 1985, possessed the cadaverous pallor and puny physique of someone who had spent his life in airless rooms lifting nothing heavier than a wooden chess piece, Kasparov by contrast was all simian movements and saturnine stares. His opponents spoke of his physical presence as if he were an athlete or a boxer rather than what they were, chess nerds. He trained for big matches with a fitness regime and careful diet. Short referred to his 'weightlifter's energy' and that was before Kasparov crushed him in their 1993 World Championship match.

And while chess players tend by nature to be self-absorbed, distracted, reclusive, Kasparov was an extrovert with no interest in concealing his high opinion of himself. As he put it in his 1987 autobiography, Child of Change, he was 'not one to hide my light under a bushel'. In the book he described his triumphs with an undisguised pride bordering on glee. He quoted praise at length and gave short shrift to criticism. Dubbed by his rivals the 'Beast of Baku', he later outlined his relationship with his fellow chess professionals. 'Most of the other players hate me because I beat them regularly,' he explained. 'Most of them have a devastatingly bad record against me.'

Everything about Kasparov, including his impenetrably thick hair, seemed to speak of the indomitable. He produced moves that teams of grandmasters would take days to unravel. And for 20 years, give or take the occasional blip, he could not be beaten. Then, earlier this year, having won the prestigious Linares tournament in Spain, he announced his retirement. Not for him the obscurity or notoriety that his predecessors encountered after chess, not for him the struggle against dwindling powers and memory. Instead, Kasparov informed the world that he was ready for a whole new challenge. He was going into politics.

It was a decision that underwhelmed many Russian observers. A column in the Moscow Times outlined some of the doubts about Kasparov's political abilities. 'The country's media, political analysts and even some of his fellow liberals see him more as a dilettante who does not understand the rules of the game and who has more than one failed political venture to his name, from the Democratic Party of Russia, to the Liberal-Conservative Union, and now to the risky Committee 2008: Free Choice. Critics and even friends of Kasparov have noted an inability to commit to any one project for a sustained period. In short, everyone seems to be telling Kasparov: "Don't dabble with the real world, go back to the safe confines of the 64 squares on the chessboard." '

Kasparov once quoted his countryman, Vladimir Nabokov's appraisal of the talents required to excel at his chosen game. 'Chess problems demand from the composer the same virtues that characterise all worthwhile art: originality, invention, conciseness, harmony, complexity - and splendid insincerity.'

It's safe to say that in the art of politics you can do without all of those talents except, of course, the last. And not even his fiercest critics would accuse Kasparov of insincerity, splendid or otherwise. In an interview two years ago, he seemed to acknowledge that his need to voice unpalatable truths might be a weakness in the political arena. 'With strong views and very little flexibility, you don't make a good politician,' he said, before adding a tantalising rider. 'Except in some crucial moments.'

It just so happens that Kasparov believes that now is one such crucial moment. 'In Russia,' he told me, 'there is no more politics in terms of campaigning, promoting your views, debating your points. The regime has destroyed democratic institutions. In such circumstances what you need is to raise your voice, stand firm and fight the regime. I don't think flexibility helps you very much. It's about fighting.'

Kasparov was probably the most aggressive player in modern chess. Though nearly all chess players like to talk about 'destroying' or 'crushing' their opponent, very often the way they play can appear more like boring their opponent to a standstill. Not Kasparov. He relished a fight. He moved his pieces as if they were weapons. He once said that he learned about politics through chess, and if that's the case then Kasparov's current tactics make a kind of chess sense. He has decided to target the King. He wants to take out the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin. But to succeed he will have to play the game of his life against an opponent loaded with almost every advantage. When he was a small boy, he once recalled, he saw a chess game 'in which small pawns were victorious over what looked like a more powerful enemy. This captivated me, and I have loved to attack ever since childhood.' But for Kasparov to defeat the Putin regime would be more like the equivalent of a solitary white knight vanquishing a near full set of black pieces.

I met Kasparov back in June, in a small hotel discreetly tucked away between Knightsbridge and Chelsea. He was wearing a light-green checked suit and a cravat that made it appear as if his wardrobe selection was the fruit of judicious reference to the works of PG Wodehouse. He sat on the edge of his seat as he talked, just as he used to when playing chess.

There's a physical impatience about the man that suggests he's already three steps ahead of you and he may not care to wait. I went out to put some coins in the parking meter just before he was about to be photographed and when I returned a couple of minutes later the photo session had been completed.

Kasparov has always appeared in a rush, which may explain why he used to look so precociously middle aged. Born Garik Weinstein in Baku - what was then part of the Soviet Union but is now the independent state of Azerbaijan - Kasparov lost his father when he was seven. 'I had to rely on myself,' he told me, though he also acknowledged the vital role of his mother. 'From an early age she decided to dedicate her life [to me], which made a very strong bond which affected my life - for good or bad, that's another story.'

There is a wealth of Freudian literature on the meaning of the Queen in chess, and many chess players, including Fischer (whose mother was called Regina) have had intense and often difficult relationships with their mothers. Similarly, in keeping with the Oedipal theme (the aim of chess is to kill the King), they have also, again like Fischer, often had absent fathers.

It has been written that Kasparov's father, who was Jewish, perished in a car accident. But along with the widely disseminated idea that Kasparov speaks 15 languages (he speaks two) this story lacks only the quality of truth. 'He died from leukaemia,' Kasparov said. 'We never had any money to buy a car.'

At the age of 10 he was taken under the wing of Mikhail Botvinnik, the Soviet former world chess champion. At 12 he was identified as a future world champion. By the age of 22, when he became world champion, Kasparov displayed the self-possession of a man of double those years. Photographs from the time show him dressed in a jacket and tie, with the kind of facial hair that requires shaving on the hour, and they make him seem almost eligible for a midlife crisis.

Now, at 42, his chronological age has at last caught up with his physical self. He has been married twice and has two children, he has travelled the globe and lived under both communism and capitalism and whatever system it is that now operates in Russia. But whatever world weariness he's accumulated is more than offset by his natural energy if not, perhaps, what you would call ebullience.

On the desk to his side there sat two books. One published by the Federation Internationale des Echecs (Fide) and the other titled Speak Like Churchill. Chess and politics, his twin passions. His great political hero is Winston Churchill. 'He came up with his ideas, he fought for them and his ideas were right,' he says. Kasparov may have some of Churchill's resolve, but he certainly lacks his oratory skill, at least in English. He talks politics in a dry analytical style that may, one hopes, have lost something in translation.

It's only when he conveys a sense of moral outrage that his words achieve a heroic flourish. Halfway through our conversation, which lasted for a couple of hours, he said: 'Recently I've been contemplating my future steps and I realised my choice is very simple. Either I leave my country or stay, and if I stay I have to fight. To ignore what has been done by KGB rulers would be damaging my sense of honour. Leaving my country would also be damaging because, why should I leave? Why me, why not Putin?'

His dislike of Putin is genuine. A dismissive sneer contorts his face each time he mentions his name. 'I think simply that the man doesn't fit his position,' is his opinion of the Russian president. And when I ask what he thinks is Putin's estimation of him, his response is withering. 'Frankly speaking, I don't care. I've met too many KGB colonels in my life to pay attention to their opinions even if they turn out by accident to be presidents of my country.'

The fact remains, however, that Putin's various moves against democracy and free speech have had little effect on his international reputation and even less on his domestic support. He may have closed down or bought up the overwhelming majority of critical media. He may have overseen a ruthless, in many ways disastrous, and arguably genocidal campaign in Chechnya. He may do favourable business with the oligarchs who back his regime and hound those - like the recently imprisoned Mikhail Khodorkovsky - who protest against it. But none of that overly concerns the mass of Russians for whom a strong authoritarian leader appears to remain a preferable path to the uncertainties of democracy and the free market. A serious opposition movement has simply not taken shape, partly because of Putin's grip on the media and partly because the high price of oil has buoyed a fragile economy. And in any case Putin is bound by law to step down in 2008.

Nevertheless, Kasparov is focusing on Putin because he believes that if he can expose him as a self-serving autocrat and bring him down, he can also strike a blow against the venal bureaucrats and billionaires who form a crony state. 'More and more Russians are realising that Putin is creating unique conditions for oligarchs to plunder the country and take money outside, providing they pay their dues to the regime. [Ramon] Abramovich,' he continues, citing the oil magnate and owner of Chelsea football club, 'is for Russians a symbol a corruption.'

So what, as another Russian once asked, is to be done?

'Travel across the country, meet people, tell them what's right, what's wrong. People like me are not allowed on Russian TV. The only solution, the partial solution is to go round and talk to people. In many regions there is still an open window of opportunity because local TV stations are still in private hands. I had 14 appearances in Siberia in two days.'

Kasparov told me that he was shortly off to the North Caucasus, where the Beslan atrocity took place. If he did not know before, then he was to see on that trip just what he was up against. He was prevented by the authorities from attending various meetings. He had eggs and ketchup thrown at him. In three cities his plane was refused permission to land. Hotels were mysteriously booked up or closed and venues were suddenly cancelled. It was clearly a concerted effort to stop Kasparov from spreading his message.

I asked Maria Lipman, a political specialist at Moscow's Carnegie Centre, how Kasparov is seen in Russia. The fact that he was half-Armenian and half-Jewish would not play well with Russian nationalists, she said, 'but it's really that he's so radical in being a westerniser and so clearly wants Russia as part of the globalised world that is of limited appeal to most Russians.'

She was impressed by the way that Kasparov had taken to travelling across the country. 'He seems to be really enjoying it. I don't think other liberal politicians have the energy or cash. They got disillusioned early on.'

All the same, she did not think that Kasparov's standing as a chess hero did much for his image in Russia. 'Chess has lost its popularity from Soviet days,' she explained. 'It's not longer promoted at the highest levels. And also even when he was world champion Kasparov was always seen as too anti-state, too cosmopolitan.'

This view of Kasparov as somehow an outsider goes right back to the days of his greatest triumph. In 1984 he challenged Anatoly Karpov, the world champion who inherited the title when Bobby Fischer retreated into a religious cult and refused to play him. Karpov was the darling of the Soviet establishment. A dedicated communist (he has since become a hard-core nationalist), he was treated like the official Soviet candidate.

Kasparov, too, was a communist, or at least a member of the Communist Party. 'Without making that step,' he told me, 'I wouldn't have got the support that was absolutely crucial for me to survive in that environment.' He later became an advocate of Mikhail Gorbachev, then an opponent, when he became frustrated at the slow pace of reform. It was not until January 1990, however, that he handed in his membership of the Communist Party.

Back in 1984, Kasparov showed no such deliberation. He tore into Karpov, launching a series of fearless attacks. As a result he lost three of the first seven games. Then two of the next 20 games. He was 0-5 down. Karpov had only to win one more game to retain his title. But Kasparov made an amazing and gruelling comeback, drawing game after game, and then winning three.

After five months of play, Karpov was a nervous wreck and looked close to exhaustion. His friend, Florencio Campomanes, the president of Fide, controversially decided to end the match just when Kasparov, for the first time in the event, looked to be the favourite to win.

Typically, Kasparov does not undersell his achievement. 'If you look at the odds of surviving in such a situation against Karpov, I don't think there's anything comparable in the history of any sport.' When I asked him the daunting size of the political task he has now undertaken, he replied: 'After saving that match against Karpov I believe anything can be done.'

Despite his anger with Fide, Kasparov won the rematch and so began his 20 years of dominance. It's true that he lost his title in London in 2000 to Vladimir Kramnik, but by then the chess World Championship had begun to resemble boxing, with competing governing bodies. In any case, Kasparov now says the defeat did him a favour 'because I could reinvent myself playing new, highly sophisticated chess and that gave me five years on top'. When he retired he was still rated number one in the world.

Kasparov, who writes a column for the Wall Street Journal and is busy with a series of books, will survive without chess (he restricts himself nowadays to anonymous games on the internet), but it's much less clear how well chess will do without Kasparov. There are no household names. He was the one player with global appeal and the professional game is unlikely to emerge from his considerable shadow for some time.

Equally uncertain is how Kasparov will fare in politics. He was renowned for his bold openings on the chessboard and so far, with his Russian roadshow, he has not disappointed. But does he have a middle game, much less an endgame? His various attempts to form a liberal coalition have failed, his critics claim, because of his unwillingness to compromise and his need to control decisions. And many observers expect his latest venture, the United Civil Front, which aims to combine all anti-Putin forces from left to right, to go the same way.

There is also the matter of financing. Kasparov is a wealthy man but not so wealthy that he can maintain a political movement without proper backing. 'We've got very little money,' he conceded, 'but the good thing is that there are quite a few rich people who are now ready to finance us anonymously. Funding us is a death warrant for any Russian businessman.'

So far, he has confined his stated ambitions to a negative - getting rid of the Putin regime. What he has refused to do is confirm his own interest in becoming president. I asked him about his long-term aim.

'Well, it might be that I find myself very useful,' he said with an expression of unironic sincerity. 'It might be that I offer my vision to the country, whether it's accepted or not. I think Russia virtually has to be rewritten from scratch.'

As things stand, it seems implausible that Kasparov should ever land the job of doing the rewrite. But it would be foolish to underestimate the boy from Baku. After all, he used to come up with ploys and gambits and moves that no one else in the world could see. And this particular game has only just started.

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/21/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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Thursday, August 18, 2005

Blood Runs Red, Not Blue

The sons and daughters of the privileged are preoccupied building their lucrative career or playing hockey with each other while the sons and daughters of poor and under-privileged are doing the dying for the sake of an ideology that quite possibly only serves purpose for the elites and their charlatans.

Bush is shielded from unpleasant news by a tight group of people, a coccoon, even the former officials of his administration reported the same, saying: "a president carefully shielded from unpleasant or dissonant information. According to former Environmental Protection Agency administrator Christine Todd Whitman, "There is a palace guard, and they want to run interference for him." Former Treasury secretary Paul O'Neill described Bush as "caught in an echo chamber of his own making, cut off from everyone other than a circle around him that's tiny and getting smaller and in concert on everything."

Less one may mistake thinking that Bush is surrounded by forceful shield, but the fact is Bush himself likes it that way, in many occasions he said the following: "In 2004 the president told a Washington Times reporter that he doesn't watch news on TV or even read the newspaper except to scan the front page. "I like to have a clear outlook," he explained. "It can be a frustrating experience to pay attention to somebody's false opinion or somebody's characterization, which simply isn't true."

Anyone goes against his constricted view, gets axed from the privileged position, like the following: "When Gen. Eric Shinseki suggested the occupation might require several hundred thousand troops, the Pentagon hastily announced his replacement, rendering him a lame duck. National Economic Council director Lawrence Lindsey lost his job soon after telling the Wall Street Journal that the war could cost up to $200 billion."

A grieving mother of an American dead soldier Casey is out on the street, just a few yards from Bush's modern palace-ranch in Crawford, but her cries of protest is getting ignored, since the first time the mother, Ms. Cindy Sheehan had met with Bush, "He didn't want to hear anything about Casey," she told CNN. "He wouldn't even call him 'him' or 'he.' He called him 'your loved one.' Every time we tried to talk about Casey and how much we missed him, he would change the subject."

Of course he would, because Mr. Bush wants to have a "clear outlook", clear of any shred of unpleasant truth.

"This is a war fought mostly by other people's children. The loudest of the hawks are the least likely to send their sons or daughters off to Iraq."

"Your loved one", not privileged mine!

Say Amen, loud and clear!

Regards,
Sohel

Blood Runs Red, Not Blue

By BOB HERBERT

You have to wonder whether reality ever comes knocking on George W. Bush's door. If it did, would the president with the unsettling demeanor of a boy king even bother to answer? Mr. Bush is the commander in chief who launched a savage war in Iraq and now spends his days happily riding his bicycle in Texas.

This is eerie. Scary. Surreal.

The war is going badly and lives have been lost by the thousands, but there is no real sense, either at the highest levels of government or in the nation at large, that anything momentous is at stake. The announcement on Sunday that five more American soldiers had been blown to eternity by roadside bombs was treated by the press as a yawner. It got very little attention.

You can turn on the television any evening and tune in to the bizarre extended coverage of the search for Natalee Holloway, the Alabama teenager who disappeared in Aruba in May. But we hear very little about the men and women who have given up their lives in Iraq, or are living with horrific injuries suffered in that conflict.

If only the war were more entertaining. Less of a downer. Perhaps then we could meet the people who are suffering and dying in it.

For all the talk of supporting the troops, they are a low priority for most Americans. If the nation really cared, the president would not be frolicking at his ranch for the entire month of August. He'd be back in Washington burning the midnight oil, trying to figure out how to get the troops out of the terrible fix he put them in.

Instead, Mr. Bush is bicycling as soldiers and marines are dying. Dozens have been killed since he went off on his vacation.

As for the rest of the nation, it's not doing much for the troops, either. There was a time, long ago, when war required sacrifices that were shared by most of the population. That's over.

I was in Jacksonville, Fla., a few days ago and watched in amusement as a young woman emerged from a restaurant into 95-degree heat and gleefully exclaimed, "All right, let's go shopping!" The war was the furthest thing from her mind.

For the most part, the only people sacrificing for this war are the troops and their families, and very few of them are coming from the privileged economic classes. That's why it's so easy to keep the troops out of sight and out of mind. And it's why, in the third year of a war started by the richest nation on earth, we still get stories like the one in Sunday's Times that began:

"For the second time since the Iraq war began, the Pentagon is struggling to replace body armor that is failing to protect American troops from the most lethal attacks by insurgents."

Scandalous incompetence? Appalling indifference? Try both. Who cares? This is a war fought mostly by other people's children. The loudest of the hawks are the least likely to send their sons or daughters off to Iraq.

The president has never been clear about why we're in Iraq. There's no plan, no strategy. In one of the many tragic echoes of Vietnam, U.S. troops have been fighting hellacious battles to seize areas controlled by insurgents, only to retreat and allow the insurgents to return.

If Mr. Bush were willing to do something he has refused to do so far - speak plainly and honestly to the American people about this war - he might be able to explain why U.S. troops should continue with an effort that is, in large part at least, benefiting Iraqi factions that are murderous, corrupt and terminally hostile to women. If by some chance he could make that case, the next appropriate step would be to ask all Americans to do their part for the war effort.

College kids in the U.S. are playing video games and looking forward to frat parties while their less fortunate peers are rattling around like moving targets in Baghdad and Mosul, trying to dodge improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades.

There is something very, very wrong with this picture.

If the war in Iraq is worth fighting - if it's a noble venture, as the hawks insist it is - then it's worth fighting with the children of the privileged classes. They should be added to the combat mix. If it's not worth their blood, then we should bring the other troops home.

If Mr. Bush's war in Iraq is worth dying for, then the children of the privileged should be doing some of the dying.

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/18/2005 No comments: Links to this post
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Wednesday, August 17, 2005

The World Is Round

The world is round, not flat. Thomas L. Friedman's recent book "The World is Flat" has stirred quite a debate, especially in the Western hemisphere. The New York Review of Books this week has published a good review of Friedman's book written by John Gray. Mr. Gray is a prominent scholar on his own right, a professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics. My first introduction to his writings other than reading the occasional opinion editorials through one of his outstanding books "Straw Dogs: Thoughts of Humans and Other Animals" last year.

Unlike Mr. Friedman, I find Mr. Gray's writings to be more pragmatic, though his thoughts of impending gloom from more catastrophic disasters to unfold in many of our lifetime is unsettling, at least Mr. Gray's view of the world history is not unidirectional like Mr. Friedman and many of his neoliberal compatriots.

Regards,
Sohel

The World Is Round

By John Gray

Thomas Friedman
(click for larger image)
Thomas Friedman by David Levine
The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century
by Thomas L. Friedman

Farrar, Straus and Giroux,488 pp., $27.50

1.

The belief that a process of globalization is underway which is bringing about a fundamental change in human affairs is not new. Marx and Engels expressed it in 1848, when they wrote in a justly celebrated passage in The Communist Manifesto:

All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with his sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.... It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.

Marx and Engels had no doubt that they were witnessing the emergence of a global market—a worldwide system of production and consumption that disregarded national and cultural boundaries. They welcomed this development, not only for the increasing wealth it produced but also because they believed it enabled humanity to overcome the divisions of the past. In the global marketplace nationalism and religion were destined to be dwindling forces. There would be many convulsions—wars, revolutions, and counterrevolutions—before the Communist order was securely established; but when global capitalism had completed its work a new era in the life of humankind would begin.


The centrally planned economies that were constructed to embody Marx's vision of communism have nearly all been swept away, and the mass political movements that Marxism once inspired are no more. Yet Marx's view of globalization lives on, and nowhere more vigorously than in the writings of Thomas Friedman. Like Marx, Friedman believes that globalization is in the end compatible with only one economic system; and like Marx he believes that this sys-tem enables humanity to leave war, tyranny, and poverty behind. To his credit Friedman recognizes the parallels between his view and that of Marx. He cites an illuminating conversation at Harvard in which the communitarian political theorist Michael Sandel alerted him to the fact that the process of global "flattening" he examines in his new book was first identified by Marx, quoting at length from The Communist Manifesto—including the passage cited above—and praising Marx for his prescience. This acknowledgment of the parallels between his view of globalization and Marx's theory of history is welcome and useful.

Friedman has emerged as the most powerful contemporary publicist of neoliberal ideas. Neoliberals have a wide variety of views on political and social matters, ranging from the highly conservative standpoint of Friedrich Hayek to the more rigorously libertarian position of Milton Friedman; but they are at one in seeing the free market as the fountainhead of human freedom. Though in some of his writings he shows a concern for the casualties of deregulated markets, Thomas Friedman is a passionate missionary for this neoliberal faith. In his view the free market brings with it most of the ingredients that make for a free and humanly fulfilling society, and he has propagated this creed indefatigably in his books and in columns in The New York Times.

Friedman's views have been highly influential, shaping the thinking of presidents and informing American policy on a number of issues, and it may be instructive to note the matters in which he shares Marx's blind spots. Because they were on opposite sides of the cold war it is often assumed that neoliberalism and Marxism are fundamentally antagonistic systems of ideas. In fact they belong to the same style of thinking, and share many of the same disabling limitations. For Marxists and neoliberals alike it is technological advance that fuels economic development, and economic forces that shape society. Politics and culture are secondary phenomena, sometimes capable of retarding human progress; but in the last analysis they cannot prevail against advancing technology and growing productivity.

Friedman is unequivocal in endorsing this reductive philosophy. He writes that he is often asked if he is a technological determinist, and with the innocent enthusiasm that is a redeeming feature of his prose style he declares resoundingly: "This is a legitimate question, so let me try to answer it directly: I am a technological determinist! Guilty as charged." (The italics are Friedman's.)


Technological determinism may contain a kernel of truth but it suggests a misleadingly simple view of history. This is well illustrated in Friedman's account of the demise of the Soviet Union. Acknowledging that there "was no single cause," he goes on:

To some degree the termites just ate away at the foundations of the Soviet Union, which were already weakened by the system's own internal contradictions and inefficiencies; to some degree the Reagan administration's military buildup in Europe forced the Kremlin to bankrupt itself paying for warheads; and to some degree Mikhail Gorbachev's hapless efforts to reform something that was unreformable brought communism to an end. But if I had to point to one factor as first among equals, it was the information revolution that began in the early- to mid-1980s. Totalitarian systems depend on a monopoly of information and force, and too much information started to slip through the Iron Curtain, thanks to the spread of fax machines, telephones, and other modern tools of communication.

What is striking in this otherwise unexceptionable list is what it leaves out. There is no mention of the role of Solidarity and the Catholic Church in making Poland the first post-Communist country, or of the powerful independence movements that developed in the Baltic nations during the Eighties. Most strikingly, there is no mention of the war in Afghanistan. By any account strategic defeat at the hands of Western-armed Islamist forces in that country (including some that formed the organization which was later to become al-Qaeda) was a defining moment in the decline of Soviet power. If Friedman ignores these events, it may be because they attest to the persistent power of religion and nationalism— forces that in his simple, deterministic worldview should be withering away.


It is an irony of history that a view of the world falsified by the Communist collapse should have been adopted, in some of its most misleading aspects, by the victors in the cold war. Neoliberals, such as Friedman, have reproduced the weakest features of Marx's thought—its consistent underestimation of nationalist and religious movements and its unidirectional view of history. They have failed to absorb Marx's insights into the anarchic and self-destructive qualities of capitalism. Marx viewed the unfettered market as a revolutionary force, and understood that its expansion throughout the world was bound to be disruptive and violent. As capitalism spreads, it turns society upside down, destroying entire industries, ways of life, and regimes. This can hardly be expected to be a peaceful process, and in fact it has been accompanied by major conflicts and social upheavals. The expansion of European capitalism in the nineteenth century involved the Opium Wars, genocide in the Belgian Congo, the Great Game in Central Asia, and many other forms of imperial conquest and rivalry. The seeming triumph of global capitalism at the end of the twentieth century followed two world wars, the cold war, and savage neocolonial conflicts.

Over the past two hundred years, the spread of capitalism and industrialization has gone hand in hand with war and revolution. It is a fact that would not have surprised Marx. Why do Friedman and other neoliberals believe things will be any different in the twenty-first century? Part of the answer lies in an ambiguity in the idea of globalization. In current discussion two different notions are commonly conflated: the belief that we are living in a period of rapid and continuous technological innovation, which has the effect of linking up events and activities throughout the world more widely and quickly than before; and the belief that this process is leading to a single worldwide economic system. The first is an empirical proposition and plainly true, the second a groundless ideological assertion. Like Marx, Friedman elides the two.

2.

In The World Is Flat, Friedman tells us that globalization has three phases: the first from 1492 to around 1800, in which countries and governments opened up trade with the New World and which was driven by military expansion and the amount of horse-power and wind power countries could employ; the second from 1800 to 2000, in which global integration was driven by multinational companies, steam engines, and railways; and the third, in which individuals are the driving force and the defining technology is a worldwide fiber-optic network. In each of these phases, he tells us, technology is the driving force: globalization is a byproduct of technologi-cal development. Here Friedman deviates from the standard view among contemporary economists, who see globalization largely as the result of policies of deregulation. Here he is closer to Marx—and to the realities of history.

In any longer perspective what we are witnessing today is only the most recent phase of worldwide industrialization. In the nineteenth century the world was shrunk by the advent of the telegraph; today it is shrinking again as a consequence of the Internet. Contrary to Friedman, however, the increasing facility of communication does not signify a quantum shift in human affairs. The uses of petroleum and electricity changed human life more deeply than any of the new information technologies have done. Even so, they did not end war and tyranny and usher in a new era of peace and plenty. Like other technological innovations, they were used for a variety of purposes, and became part of the normal conflicts of history.

It is necessary to distinguish between globalization—the ongoing process of worldwide industrialization—and the various economic systems in which this process has occurred. Globalization did not stop when Lenin came to power in Russia. It went on—actively accelerated by Stalin's policies of agricultural collectivization. Nor was globalization in any way slowed by the dirigiste regimes that developed in Asia —first in Japan in the Meiji era and later in the militarist period, then after World War II in Korea and Taiwan. All these regimes were vehicles through which globalization continued its advance. Worldwide industrialization continued when the liberal international economic order fell apart after World War I, and it will carry on if the global economic regime that was established after the fall of communism falls apart in its turn.

There is no systematic connection between globalization and the free market. It is no more essentially friendly to liberal capitalism than to central planning or East Asian dirigisme. Driven by technological changes that occur in many regimes, the process of globalization is more powerful than any of them. This is a truth that Friedman—as an avowed technological determinist—should accept readily enough. If he does not, it is because it shows how baseless are the utopian hopes he attaches to a process that abounds in conflicts and contradictions. Globalization makes the world smaller. It may also make it—or sections of it—richer. It does not make it more peaceful, or more liberal. Least of all does it make it flat.

Friedman's by now famous discovery of the world's flatness came to him when he was talking to Nandan Nilekani, CEO of one of India's leading new high-technology companies, Infosys Technologies, at its campus in Bangalore. The Indian entrepreneur remarked to Friedman: "Tom, the playing field is being leveled." The observation is commonplace, but it hit Friedman with the force of a revelation. "What Nandan is saying, I thought, is that the playing field is being flattened.... Flattened? Flattened? My God, he's telling me the world is flat!" Five hundred years ago, Columbus "returned safely to prove definitively that the world was round." As a matter of fact it was not Columbus who provided the proof but the Portuguese navigator Ferdinand Magellan, whose ship circled the globe in a three-year voyage from 1519 to 1522. Regardless, Friedman sees himself as a latter-day Columbus who has discovered that the world is no longer round: "I scribbled four words down in my notebook: 'The world is flat.'"


The metaphor of a flat world is worked relentlessly throughout this overlong book, but it is not its incessant repetition that is most troublesome. It is Friedman's failure to recognize that in many ways, some of them not difficult to observe, the world is becoming distinctly less flat. While he acknowledges the existence of an "unflat" world composed of people without access to the benefits of new technology, he never connects the growth of this netherworld of the relatively poor with the advance of globalization. At times his failure to connect is almost comic. Recalling his visit to the Infosys headquarters in Bangalore, Friedman writes:

The Infosys campus is reached by a pockmarked road, with sacred cows, horse-drawn carts, and motorized rickshaws all jostling alongside our vans. Once you enter the gates of Infosys, though, you are in a different world. A massive resort-size swimming pool nests amid boulders and manicured lawns, adjacent to a huge putting green. There are multiple restaurants and a fabulous health club.

Friedman notes in passing that the Infosys campus has its own power supply. He does not ask why this is necessary, or comment on the widening difference in standards of life in the region that it represents. Yet it is only by decoupling itself from its local environment that Infosys is able to compete effectively in global markets. Infosys demonstrates that globalization does have the effect of leveling some inequalities in world markets, but the success of the company has been achieved by using services and infrastructure that the society around it lacks.

As it levels some inequalities, globalization raises others. Friedman tells us that he is in favor of what he calls "compassionate flatism," which seems to mean a range of centrist or social-democratic policies designed to enhance job mobility while preserving economic security, such as portable personal pensions. In an American setting these may be useful proposals, and it is strange that in the countries that have been most exposed to the disruptive effects of globalization Friedman appears to favor neoliberal policies of the most conventional kind. He describes the fall of the Berlin Wall as a "world-flattening event," and cites Russia as one of the countries that has most benefited from the new flat world.

There can be no doubt that the Soviet collapse represented an advance for human freedom. Yet since then Russia has suffered rising levels of absolute poverty and large increases in inequality of wealth, and it seems clear that the economic "shock therapy" administered on Western advice just after the Communist collapse contributed to these developments. Price decontrol wiped out small family savings, and by limiting the benefits of privatizing government industries to a small number of insiders produced a marked concentration of wealth. As a result, large parts of the Russian population have been excluded from the benefits of the global market. Other policies could likely have avoided or mitigated this outcome.[1]

In view of the Soviet inheritance, the process of transition was bound to be prolonged and difficult. Attempting it in the space of a few years was folly, and shock therapy resulted in the impoverishment of many millions of people. It also fueled a backlash against the West. Socioeconomic change on the scale that occurred in post-Communist Russia tends to produce a political aftershock, and the emergence of Vladimir Putin can be seen as an unintended consequence of Western-sponsored free market policies. In some contexts free market policies continue, but Putin has reasserted political control of the economy as a whole, reined in the political activities of the oligarchs, and demonstrated a degree of independence from Western influences. As a result his quasi-authoritarian regime seems to possess a popular legitimacy that Yeltsin's lacked, and there is no discernible prospect of Western-style "democratic capitalism."


Globalization has no inherent tendency to promote the free market or liberal democracy. Neither does it augur an end to nationalism or great-power rivalries. Describing a long conversation with the CEO of a small Indian game company in Bangalore, Friedman recounts the entrepreneur concluding: "India is going to be a superpower and we are going to rule." Friedman replies: "Rule whom?" Friedman's response suggests that the present phase of globalization is tending to make imbalances of power between states irrelevant. In fact what it is doing is creating new great powers, and this is one of the reasons it has been embraced in China and India.

Neoliberals interpret globalization as being driven by a search for greater productivity, and view nationalism as a kind of cultural backwardness that acts mainly to slow this process. Yet the economic takeoff in both England and the US occurred against the background of a strong sense of nationality, and nationalist resistance to Western power was a powerful stimulus of economic development in Meiji Japan.

Nationalism fueled the rapid growth of capitalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,[2] and is doing the same in China and India at the present time. In both countries globalization is being embraced not only because of the prosperity it makes possible, but also for the opportunity it creates to challenge Western hegemony. As China and India become great powers they will demand recognition of their distinctive cultures and values, and international institutions will have to be reshaped to reflect the legitimacy of a variety of economic and political models. At that point the universal claims of the United States and other Western nations will be fundamentally challenged, and the global balance of power will shift.

3.

In The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999), Friedman focused on the tension between the "Lexus" forces of global economic integration and the "Olive Tree" forces of cultural identity, and in The World Is Flat he tells us that after September 11 he spent much of his time traveling in the Arab and Muslim worlds and lost track of globalization. Actually it was not globalization he lost sight of but rather the forces of identity that shape it. Friedman writes that the nation-state is "the biggest source of friction" in global markets. In fact nationalist resistance to globalization is more prominent in advanced countries such as France, Holland, and the US than in emerging economies. Friedman himself expresses concern about the impact of outsourcing on American employment, and there has been a steady drift toward greater protectionism in the Bush administration's trade policies. American nationalism may already be acting as a brake on globalization. In the fast-industrializing countries of Asia, nationalism is one of globalization's driving forces.

Rising nationalism is part of the process of globalization, and so too are intensifying geopolitical rivalries. Just as it did when the Great Game was played out in the decades leading up to the First World War, ongoing industrialization is setting off a scramble for natural resources. The US, Russia, China, India, Japan, and the countries of the European Union are all of them involved in attempts to secure energy supplies, and their field of competition ranges from Central Asia through the Persian Gulf to Africa and parts of Latin America. The coming century could be marked by recurrent resource wars, as the great powers struggle for control of the planet's hydrocarbons.[3]

Moreover, worldwide industrialization appears to be coming up against serious environmental limits. An increasing number of expert observers believe global oil reserves may be peaking,[4] and there is a consensus among climate scientists that the worldwide shift to an energy-intensive industrial lifestyle is contributing to global warming. If these fears are well founded the next phase of globalization could encompass upheavals as large as any in the twentieth century.


It would be wrong to suggest that Friedman is oblivious of these risks. In an interesting aside, he writes:

Islamo-Leninism, in many ways, emerged from the same historical context as the European radical ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Fascism and Marxism-Leninism grew out of the rapid industrialization and modernization of Germany and Central Europe, where communities living in tightly bonded villages and extended families suddenly got shattered.

Again, Friedman recognizes that many of the innovations of the current phase of globalization are reproduced in al-Qaeda. In the past two decades some of the most advanced global corporations have ceased to be top-heavy bureaucracies, and become streamlined networks of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. Al-Qaeda has emulated this change, operating as a network of autonomous cells rather than the highly centralized organizations of revolutionary parties in the past. Perhaps most interestingly, Friedman acknowledges that America's dependency on imported oil exposes it to attack, and urges American energy independence:

If President Bush made energy independence his moon shot, in one fell swoop he would dry up revenue for terrorism, force Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia on the path of reform—which they will never do with $50-a-barrel oil—strengthen the dollar, and improve his own standing in Europe by doing something huge to reduce global warming.

Friedman's advocacy of American energy independence illustrates the error of a unidirectional view of history. Energy autarchy may be a sensible policy, but it signifies a retreat from globalization. The Lexus and the Olive Tree trumpeted the arrival of a harmoniously integrated world. Since then the US has suffered terrorist attack and become mired in an intractable insurgency in Iraq. Against this background the prospect of severing one of the crucial supply chains that link the US with the world is beginning to look extremely tempting. As he has done in previous books Friedman has expressed a powerful larger mood, and in this respect The World Is Flat may prove a prescient guide to future American policy.

Yet while greater energy independence may be an American national interest the notion that it would force recalcitrant countries onto a path of neoliberal reform is wishful thinking. A large drop in the oil price would surely destabilize the rentier economies of the Gulf and Central Asia, from Saudi Arabia to Turkmenistan, and in some countries could lead to the establishment of democratic rule. However, in a number of cases the chief beneficiary would likely be fundamentalism. Does Friedman really believe that democracy in Saudi Arabia would produce a liberal, pro-Western regime? In this and other countries, American energy independence could well further the advance of radical Islam.

As it has done in the past, globalization is throwing up dilemmas that have no satisfactory solution. That does not mean they cannot be more or less intelligently managed, but what is needed is the opposite of the utopian imagination. In a curious twist, the utopian mind has migrated from left to right, and from the academy to the airport bookshop. In the nineteenth century it was political activists and radical social theorists such as Marx who held out the promise that new technology was creating a new world. Today some business gurus have a similar message. There are many books announcing a global economic transformation and suggesting that governments can be reengineered to adapt to it in much the same way as corporations. The World Is Flat is an outstanding example of this genre.

Unfortunately the problems of globalization are more intractable than those of corporate life. States cannot be phased out like bankrupt firms, and large shifts in wealth and power tend to be fiercely contested. Globalization is a revolutionary change, but it is also a continuation of the conflicts of the past. In some important respects it is leveling the playing field, as Friedman's Indian interlocutor noted, and to that extent it is a force for human advance. At the same time it is inflaming nationalist and religious passions and triggering a struggle for natural resources. In Friedman's sub-Marxian, neoliberal worldview these conflicts are recognized only as forms of friction —grit in the workings of an unstoppable machine. In truth they are integral to the process itself, whose future course cannot be known. We would be better off accepting this fact, and doing what we can to cope with it.

Notes

[1] For an analysis of the failures and social costs of Western-sponsored "market reform" in post-Communist Russia and an assessment of alternative policies, see Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001).

[2] For an interesting view of the role of nationalism in the emergence of capitalism, see Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Harvard University Press, 1992).

[3] See Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Metropolitan, 2001).

[4] See Kenneth S. Deffeyes, Hubbert's Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage (Princeton University Press, 2001).

Posted by Mahbubul Karim at 8/17/2005 3 comments: Links to this post
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